Length Leakage in Oblivious Data Access Mechanisms

Abstract

This paper studies how to prevent length leakage in oblivious-data-access mechanisms against passive, persistent adversaries. Protecting both object lengths and access patterns requires navigating a three-way tradeoff among storage footprint, bandwidth footprint, and information revealed to the adversary. The paper proves lower bounds on achievable storage and bandwidth for multiple leakage profiles and presents constructions that match or nearly match those bounds.

BibTeX

@inproceedings{length-leakage,
  author = {Jia, Grace and Agarwal, Rachit and Khandelwal, Anurag},
  title = {{Length Leakage in Oblivious Data Access Mechanisms}},
  booktitle = {USENIX Security},
  month = aug,
  year = {2024}
}